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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jeremiah Spicer appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation and executing his sentence without modification. He also 
contends that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny his motion to augment the 
record with certain transcripts constituted a violation of his due process rights. 
The State responds to the due process issue, arguing that the Idaho Court of 
Appeals lacks the authority to rule on that issue. It also argues that, based on the Idaho 
Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Brunet, _ Idaho _, 316 P.3d 640 
(2013), reh'g denied, Mr. Spicer has failed to show a colorable need for the transcripts, 
and thus, has failed to show a violation of his rights. Finally, it argues that there is no 
violation because the appellate record contains all the relevant sentencing materials. 
As to the State's argument that the Court of Appeals would not have the authority 
to rule on this issue, that argument is erroneous because, as this is a valid issue to raise 
on appeal, the decision to assign the case to the Court of Appeals would give it that 
authority under the current appellate rules. However, in the event the State is correct in 
this argument, an order assigning this case to the Court of Appeals despite the lack of 
authority to decide the issue would constitute a separate violation of Mr. Spicer's due 
process rights, as it would deprive him of a meaningful opportunity to be heard on 
appeal. 
On the merits of Mr. Spicer's request for the transcripts, the State's arguments 
misapply the constitutional standard and, as a result, improperly shift the burden of 
proof. Under United States Supreme Court precedent, if the grounds of appeal (i.e., the 
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record itself) make out a colorable need for the transcripts, the State bears the burden 
of demonstrating that an alternative option for providing an adequate appellate record 
exists. In this case, the grounds of appeal do make out a colorable need for the 
requested transcripts, as the evidence presented during those hearings was relevant to 
the district court's sentencing decisions and was part of the entire record available to 
the district court when it ultimately revoked Mr. Spicer's probation. The State has not 
met its burden to demonstrate that an adequate alternative of Mr. Spicer's statements of 
allocution made during the sentencing, disposition, and rider review hearings is 
available to provide an adequate record. The other materials, which the State claims 
provide an adequate record, do not actually contain a record of those statements, and 
therefore are not an adequate alternative to the verbatim transcripts. Therefore, its 
arguments on the due process violation issue fail. 
As to the revocation of probation and the execution of Mr. Spicer's sentence, the 
State simply argues that the district court's decisions were not an abuse of discretion. 
Since those arguments are not remarkable, no further argument will be made in that 
regard. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Spicer's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1 . Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Spicer due process and equal 
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with transcripts 
necessary for review of the issues on appeal. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Spicer's 
probation or, alternatively, when it executed his sentence without modification 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Spicer Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For Review 
Of The Issues On Appeal 
A. Should This Case Be Assigned To The Court Of Appeals, That Court Would 
Have The Authority To Rule On All The Issues Raised In This Appeal 
The Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that the question of whether the 
appellate record is complete is a valid issue to raise on appeal. See e.g., 
Murphy v. State,_ Idaho_, 2014 WL 712695, 6-7 (2014), not yet final (addressing 
the merits of the petitioner's argument that the incomplete appellate record violated her 
due process rights); Brunet, 155 Idaho at 726-28 (same). Nevertheless, the State 
contends that the Court of Appeals would be without the authority to rule on that issue, 
should this case be assigned to that Court. (Resp. Br., p.4 n.2.) However, Idaho 
Appellate Rule 108 requires the Court of Appeals to rule on the merits of all cases to 
which it is assigned by the Supreme Court: 
Cases Reserved to Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals shall hear and 
decide all cases assigned to it by the Supreme Court; provided that the 
Supreme Court will not assign the following cases: 
(1) Proceedings invoking the original jurisdiction of the Idaho 
Supreme Court; 
(2) Appeals from imposition of sentences of capital punishment in 
criminal cases; 
(3) Appeals from the Industrial Commission; 
(4) Appeals from the Public Utilities Commission; 
(5) Review of the recommendatory orders of the Board of 
Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar; 
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(6) Review of recommendatory orders of the Judicial Council. 
LA.R. 108 (emphasis added). Since the issues raised in this appeal do not fall into any 
of the foregoing categories, the Court of Appeals has the authority to address the issues 
raised in Mr. Spicer's Appellant's Brief regarding the violation of his constitutional rights. 
Second, by assigning this case to the Court of Appeals, the Idaho Supreme 
Court would implicitly grant the Court of Appeals the authority to review Mr. Spicer's 
claims about the constitutionality of its decision to deny Mr. Spicer's request for the 
inclusion of the requested transcripts in the appellate record. Notably, the Internal 
Rules of the Supreme Court (hereinafter, I.R.S.C.) provide: 
Assignment of Cases. The chief justice (or designee) shall make the 
tentative assignment of cases as between the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeals. Copies of each assignment sheet shall be given to the 
justices, affording each an opportunity to object and request the Court to 
reconsider the assignment. 
Any objection to the assignment shall be stated, with reasons, in writing 
and circulated to all the justices. 
At the request of any justice, the objection to the assignment shall be 
taken up at conference. 
I.R.S.C. 21. Thus, the assignment of cases is not an arbitrary process; according to the 
Rule, it is a deliberate process which affords all the justices the ability to object and 
provide input into the decision to assign a case to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, a 
decision to assign a case to the Court of Appeals means that the Idaho Supreme Court 
would have reached the conclusion that all the issues raised in this appeal could 
properly be decided by the Court of Appeals. 
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Third, the Court of Appeals has indicated that it would have the authority to rule 
on the question of whether the requested transcripts need to be included in the 
appellate record. Such authority would arise if the defendant-appellant filed a renewed 
motion to augment with the Court of Appeals, once the case has been assigned thereto, 
provided that motion is based on "new information or a new or expanded basis" that 
was not presented to the Supreme Court. See State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 620 
(Ct. App. 2012), rev. denied; State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793, 796 (Ct. App. 2013), 
rev. denied. Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons, the State's assertion that the 
Court of Appeals would be without the authority to rule on this issue (Resp. Br., pp.5-7) 
is erroneous and should be rejected. 
However, in the event that the State is correct about the scope of the Court of 
Appeals' authority to rule on the issues presented in this appeal, then an order 
assigning this case to the Court of Appeals would also constitute an independent 
violation of Mr. Spicer's state and federal constitutional rights to due process. See 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. I§ 13. As the Idaho Supreme Court has 
explained: 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Pursuant to that rule, defendants have the right to appeal from 
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judgments affecting their substantial rights. State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 
(2008); I.AR. 11(c)(9). The decision to revoke probation is such an order. See, e.g., 
State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766 (2007) (recognizing that a probationer has a 
protected liberty interest in continuing probation); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (establishing the minimum due process requirements that must be 
provided when the State seeks to revoke a person's probation, which includes a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard). Therefore, since the Fourteenth Amendment's 
protections apply to all proceedings affecting this appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court 
would violate those protections by assigning this case to the Court of Appeals knowing it 
was without authority to resolve the issues presented therein because it would not 
afford Mr. Spicer a meaningful opportunity to be heard on appeal. 
B. Properly Applying The Standard For Evaluating Whether A Transcript Needs To 
Be Provided, The Grounds For Appeal Make Out A Colorable Need And The 
State Has Failed To Demonstrate That A Viable Alternative Is Available To 
Ensure An Adequate Appellate Record Is Available 
Even under the standard articulated in the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion 
in Brunet, the grounds of appeal in this case make out a colorable need for inclusion of 
the transcripts of the sentencing hearing held on January 23, 2009, the disposition 
hearing held on February 11, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on August 12, 
2010.1 The Brunet Opinion reaffirmed the existing standard of review, which is that, 
when reviewing decisions such as the decision to relinquish jurisdiction, "this Court 
conducts an independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at 
1 Given the decision in Brunet, Mr. Spicer is no longer pursuing his claims for the 
transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on October 2, 2008, and the admit/deny 
hearing held on January 28, 2010. 
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sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment." Brunet, 316 P.3d at 644 
(emphasis added) (citing State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010)). The Idaho Supreme 
Court also recognized that there is a federal and state constitutional requirement for the 
State to provide transcripts sufficient for an adequate appellate review. See id. at 
643-44 (citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971); State v. Strand, 137 
Idaho 457, 462 (2002)). 
Therefore, the two fundamental themes established in the United States 
Supreme Court decisions in this regard still control the analysis. The first fundamental 
theme is that the scope of the due process and equal protection clauses is broad, and 
the second is that disparate treatment of indigent defendants is not tolerable. As a 
result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate review, but that record 
need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials. See, e.g., Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195. 
Therefore, the rule from Brunet is that, in order to show that the transcript requested is 
necessary for an adequate appellate review, the party moving for its inclusion in the 
record "must make out a colorable need for the additional transcripts." Brunet, 316 P .3d 
at 643. That rule reflects the rule from the United States Supreme Court, but is not 
exactly the same. In Mayer, the United States Supreme Court did not hold that the 
appellant must show a colorable need; rather, it looked at the "grounds of appeal," (i.e., 
the record itself), and held that "where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out 
a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only 
a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those 
grounds". Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195. 
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The State, based on the language in Brunet, misinterprets the burden of proof in 
such cases, and erroneously contends that "[Mr.] Spicer failed to show a 'colorable 
need' for any of the transcripts .... " {Resp. Br., p.8.) However, in his Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Spicer, as required by Mayer, pointed out that the grounds of appeal in his case do 
make out a colorable need for the transcripts of the sentencing, disposition, and 
jurisdictional review hearings based on the rules articulated by the Court of Appeals in 
State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813 (Ct. App. 2003), and State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882 
(Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied. (App. Br., pp.12-14.) 
In Gervasi, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the defendant needs to have the 
opportunity to make a statement in allocution because such statements are highly 
relevant to the district court's sentencing determinations. Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816. 
Hansen clarified Gervasi, explaining that, while allocution is important, there is not a 
constitutionally-protected right to allocute. Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88. The minutes 
of the January 23, 2009, sentencing hearing reveal that Mr. Spicer "[a]ddresses the 
Court." (R., pp.74-75.) That statement of allocution is, therefore, highly relevant to the 
disposition of the recent probation violation.2 See State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 
(1998); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990). Therefore, the grounds of 
2 The State argues that Mr. Spicer's request for inclusion of these transcripts in the 
appellate record is just a "fishing expedition." (See Resp. Br., p.7.) That argument is 
erroneous. The Idaho Supreme Court explained in Brunet that claims which only 
hypothesized that factual information could exist in the transcript, which, if they exist, 
might affect the issues raised on appeal constituted an impermissible "fishing 
expedition." Brunet, 316 P.3d at 643. In this case, however, Mr. Spicer has identified 
exactly what factual information would exist in those transcripts (the statements in 
allocution) and articulated how having access to those statements would impact the 
arguments raised on appeal (they would have provided additional mitigating information 
which the district court needed to sufficiently consider). Thus, Mr. Spicer's request for 
these transcripts does not constitute an impermissible fishing expedition. 
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appeal make out a colorable need for the transcript of the January 23, 2009, sentencing 
hearing. 
Disposition and rider review hearings deal with similar concerns as sentencing 
hearings. See, e.g., State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 263-64 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(discussing these concerns as they relate to rider review hearings); State v. Chavez, 
134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussing these concerns as they relate to 
disposition hearings). Those decisions are guided by the same factors that the district 
court considers at sentencing. See Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. Therefore, the 
defendant's statements at a disposition or rider review hearing are as relevant to 
subsequent sentencing determination as a statement in allocution made at an initial 
sentencing hearing. See Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; Getvasi, 138 Idaho at 816. The 
minutes of the February 11, 2010, disposition hearing and the August 12, 2010, rider 
review hearing indicate that Mr. Spicer "addresses the court." (R., pp.127, 135.) As 
such, those statements are relevant to district court's subsequent decision to revoke 
probation. Thus, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the transcripts of 
the February 11, 2010, disposition hearing and the August 12, 2010, rider review 
hearing in this case. 
The only other question, then, is whether the evidence provided at those 
hearings was part of the entire record available to the district court when it subsequently 
decided to revoke Mr. Spicer's probation. See Brunet, 316 P.3d at 644; Pierce, 150 
Idaho at 5. The State contends that the information in the appellate record is sufficient 
because the appellate record includes the information provided in the Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), the Addendum to PSI (hereinafter, APSI), and 
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the minutes of the hearings in question. (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.) This, it contends, 
constitutes the extent of the record available to the district court, and thus, inclusion of 
those materials provides a sufficient appellate record. (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.) 
However, that argument fails to address the longstanding and still-viable case 
law which holds that district court judges are expected to rely on their memories of prior 
proceedings in a case. See, e.g., Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 
2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 
318, 321 (1977); Statev.Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989); 
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 1984 ). Since the same district court 
judge who revoked Mr. Spicer's probation also presided over the sentencing, 
disposition, and rider review hearings (compare R., pp.74-75, 126-27, 135-36, 173-76), 
the judge could rely on his memory of the statements Mr. Spicer made in allocution. 
Therefore, those statements are part of the record that was available to the district court 
when it revoked Mr. Spicer's probation. 
Furthermore, to the State's point that there are other documents which provide 
relevant information to the district court, such as the PSI or APSI, they are not sufficient 
to provide an alternative record of what Mr. Spicer told the district court during the 
hearings in question. The minutes of all three hearings only indicate that Mr. Spicer 
"[a]ddresses the Court." (R., pp.75, 127, 135.) Thus, all those minute entries reveal is 
that Mr. Spicer made a statement, not the contents of those statements. That is a 
critical point, since, according to Gervasi and Hansen, it is the contents of the statement 
which are important to the district court's decisions. See Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; 
Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816. And while the APSI does contain a statement made by 
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Mr. Spicer (PSI, p.176), there is no indication in that document, or the record as a whole 
for that matter, which suggests that Mr. Spicer's statement at the rider review hearing 
was the same as the statement included in the APSl.3 (See generally R.; PSI.) Thus, 
while the PSI and APSI materials appended to the record do contain relevant 
information to the district court's decisions, they fail to provide an adequate record of the 
mitigating information Mr. Spicer provided in his statements to the district court during 
the sentencing, disposition, and jurisdictional review hearings. Therefore, they are not 
sufficient alternatives upon which this Court could conduct its review of the entire record 
available to the district court when it revoked Mr. Spicer's probation and executed his 
sentence without modification.4 See Brunet, 316 P.3d at 643; Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195. 
As such, the State has failed to meet its burden to show that only a portion of the 
3 Even if the State is correct in that regard, the statement in the APSI is certainly not a 
valid substitute for the statements in allocution made at the sentencing or disposition 
hearings. 
4 In that same vein, an adequate appellate record is necessary to vindicate Mr. Spicer's 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 
U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963), 
and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). The State contends that 
Mr. Spicer failed to demonstrate how counsel's performance fell outside the objective 
standard of reasonableness, and therefore, there was no violation of his right to 
effective counsel. (Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) Given that the objective standard of 
reasonableness requires appellate counsel to "consider al/ issues that might affect the 
validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence" and, therefore, appropriately advise 
on the probable outcome of a challenge to the sentence, see American 
Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 4-8.3(b) (emphasis added), 
appellate counsel needs to be able to review the entire record available to the district 
court, as this Court would on review, in order to provide a professional evaluation of the 
questions that might be presented on appeal and consider all issues that might have 
affected the district court's decision to revoke probation, which is now at issue. As 
such, not providing access to an adequate appellate record also denies Mr. Spicer 
access to effective appellate counsel. 
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transcript or an alternative will suffice to provide an adequate appellate record. Mayer, 
404 U.S. at 195. 
Ultimately, even under the standards articulated in Brunet, the decision to deny 
Mr. Spicer's motion to augment the appellate record with the transcripts of the January 
29, 2009, sentencing hearing, the February 11, 2010, disposition hearing, and the 
August 12, 2010, rider review hearing violated his state and federal constitutional rights 
to equal protection and due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Spicer respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Spicer respectfully 
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or, in the 
alternative, remand the case for a new disposition hearing. 
DATED this 19th day of March, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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